The State of Utah v. Robert Holyoak : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1986
The State of Utah v. Robert Holyoak : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James G. Clark; Attorney for Appellant.
David L. Wilkinson, Attorney General; Sandra L. Sjogren; Assistant Attorney General; Attorney for
Respondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah v. Holyoak, No. 860220.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1116
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH,Jp/:/3 .,





Case No. 860220-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTION OF POSSESSION OF 
COCAINE, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1978), 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND 
FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE 
RAY M. HARDING, PRESIDING. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
SANDRA L. SJOGREN 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
JAMES G. CLARK 
42 N. University Ave., #1 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorney for Appellant f)]?f^'^^T(S| 
MAR u 0 =987 ^ 
8bO220 ~Qk 
COURT ur A. r -,**t-S 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





Case No. 860220-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTION OF POSSESSION OF 
COCAINE, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2) (a)(i) (1978), 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND 
FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE 
RAY M. HARDING, PRESIDING. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
SANDRA L. SJOGREN 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
JAMES G. CLARK 
42 N. University Ave., 
Provo, Utah 84601 
#1 
Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES i 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 4 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS SUPPORTED BY 
PROBABLE CAUSE AND THE TRIAL COURT 
PROPERLY REFUSED TO SUPPRESS THE 
SEIZED EVIDENCE 4 
POINT II THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO 
GRANT DISCLOSURE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL 




TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Alderman v. United States. 394 U.S. 165 (1969) 12 
Gaines v. Hess. 662 F.2d 1364 (10th Cir. 1981) 13 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 800 (1982) 8 
McCrav v. Illinois. 386 U.S. 300 (1967) 9 
Miller v. United States. 273 F.2d 279 
(5th Cir. 1959) 11 
Rovario v. United States. 353 U.S. 53 (1957) 9 
State v. Bailey. 675 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1984) 5, 
State v. Hansen. 50 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (filed 
Jan. 20, 1987) 5 
State v. Jordan. 665 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1983) 5 
State v. Lesley. 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983) 5 
State v. Nielsen. 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986) 6, 
9, 
State v. Romero. 660 P.2d 715 (Utah 1983) 5 
United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394 
(9th Cir. 1986) 5 
United States v. Burrell. 720 F.2d 1488 
(10th Cir. 1983) 10 
United States v. Dvba. 554 F.2d 417 
(10th Cir. 1977) 9 
United States v. Freund. 525 F.2d 873 
(5th Cir. 1976) 13 
United States v. Grisham. 748 F.2d 460 (8th 
Cir. 1984) 10 
United States v. Jefferson. 593 F.Supp. 85 
(D.D.C. 1984) 10 
United States v. Leon, U.S. , 104 S.Ct. 
3405 (1984) 8 
United States v. Lueth. 807 F.2d 719 
(8th Cir. 1986) 5 
-ii-
United States v. Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793 
(9th Cir. 1984) 12, 
United States v. Pelharc, 801 F.2d 875 
(6th Cir. 1986) 5, 6 
United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102 
(4th Cir. 1985) 10 
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) 6 
STATUTES AND RULES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Repl. Vol. 1986).... 1 
Utah R. Crim. P. 12(g) (1982) 8 
-iii-
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





Case No. 860220-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled 
substance, cocaine, a third-degree felony in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. S58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Repl. Vol. 1986). Prior to trial, 
defendant moved to suppress the evidence based upon invalidity of 
the search warrant due to lack of probable cause and a hearing 
was held on March 1, 1986. Judge Harding denied the motion to 
suppress. Defendant was tried before a jury and convicted in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Utah County, the 
Honorable Ray M. Harding presiding on April 9, 1986. Judge 
Harding sentenced defendant to serve not less than five years at 
the Utah State Prison but suspended imposition of the sentence 
and placed defendant on 18 months probation with a jail term of 
90 days and ordered defendant to pay a $500 fine. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 14, 1986 Sgt. Bradley Leatham, a Provo City 
police officer, received a tip from a confidential informant that 
defendant possessed cocaine at his home (R. 207, 211, 336). 
Based upon this tip, Sgt. Leatham presented an affidavit for a 
search warrant to Eighth Circuit Judge McGuire and later executed 
the search warrant at defendants home and seized approximately 
two grams of cocaine and a white powder appearing to be vitamin B 
powder commonly used for cutting cocaine (R. 211, 218, 262, 264, 
345). Also seized were several firearms and a handgun that was 
found under defendant's pillow (R. 243). Defendant filed a 
motion to suppress the cocaine prior to trial which Judge Harding 
denied (R. 16, 51-53, 334-371). After a jury trial, in which 
defendant did not object to admission of the cocaine, defendant 
was convicted of possession of cocaine (R. 78, 281). Defendant 
now appeals claiming that Judge Harding erred in failing to 
suppress the cocaine and in failing to order disclosure of the 
confidential informant's name. 
At the suppression hearing, Sgt. Leatham testified that 
he composed the affidavit in support of the request for a search 
warrant and attempted to avoid including so much information that 
defendant could discern the identity of the confidential 
informant (C.I.) (R. 338). The C.I. had previously given Leatham 
information leading to arrests in two other cases, however, these 
specific arrests were not mentioned in the affidavit as the basis 
for his reliability (R. 336-337) (See Appendix A for copy of 
Affidavit). Leatham talked to the C.I. three times to confirm 
the information provided and to get a complete description of 
defendant's home (R. 209, 340). The C.I. did not receive money 
in exchange for the tip but did receive a plea bargain on pending 
drug charges in exchange for his work on other drug cases (R. 
341). The C.I. told Leatham that about one ounce of cocaine was 
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located in defendant's bedroom under the plywood in a waterbed 
frame (R. 208, 213, 216-17, 344). 
A second C.I. told a fellow officer that defendant 
distributed large quantities of cocaine which defendant often 
transported in his vehicle in an attache case along with a 
handgun (R. 27, 341-42). This information was included in the 
affidavit (R. 27). Leatham also believed that defendant had 
previously been charged and convicted with distribution of 
cocaine and included this information in the affidavit (R. 26, 
241, 342). Defendant, however, had only been charged with 
distribution and was awaiting trial (R. 342-43). 
When he searched defendant's home, Leatham went 
directly to the bedroom and found a baggie of white powder where 
the C.I. told him it was hidden (R. 213, 216-17, 344). He then 
replaced the baggie in its hiding place and allowed drug-sniffing 
dogs to relocate it as a test of their abilities (R. 220, 237). 
Leatham probably showed the baggie to a second officer who was 
logging the seized items after he pulled it from the bed frame 
the first time (R. 217, 248, 252, 255). Later, Leatham showed 
the baggie to defendant who said that it was not cocaine but was 
a vitamin B complex (R. 225, 302, 345) and told Leatham to feel 
it, because it was "soft", not hard like cocaine (R. 305, 306, 
345). 
Defendant and his roommate, Donna Alex, testified that 
there was no one in their home within 24 hours of the search 
except possibly Ms. Alex's sister-in-law who could not have been 
the C.I. (R. 286, 297, 358, 361, 362). Ms. Alex said she had 
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never seen cocaine within their home in the two or three months 
she lived there prior to the search (R. 287). Defendant 
testified that he did not have any cocaine in his bedroom and 
assumed that Sgt. Leatham put the baggie of cocaine in his room 
(R. 296-97). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court properly refused to suppress the 
evidence where it found that the totality of the circumstances 
supported the magistrates finding of probable cause. Moreover, 
even if the warrant lacked probable cause, the evidence was not 
seized in a substantial violation of defendant's constitutional 
rights or in bad faith. 
II. There was no error in denying an ir\ camera hearing 
for determination of the materiality of the confidential 
informant's identity since the court found that the evidence was 
not material to defendant's defense. Even if a hearing was 
required, the remedy would be a remand for an in camera 
proceeding and not complete reversal of defendant's conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS SUPPORTED BY 
PROBABLE CAUSE AND THE TRIAL COURT 
PROPERLY REFUSED TO SUPPRESS THE SEIZED 
EVIDENCE. 
Defendant argues that the affidavit in support of the 
search warrant lacked sufficient indicia of reliability for the 
magistrate to find that probable cause existed. He also asserts 
that the affidavit did not establish the basis of the 
confidential informant's (C.I.) knowledge. As argued below, the 
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affidavit, as a whole, established a substantial basis for the 
magistrate's conclusion that the totality of the circumstances 
estaolished probable cause. See State v. Hansen, 50 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 3 (filed Jan. 20, 1987); United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 791 
F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1986) . 
While defendant did move to suppress the cocaine prior 
to trial, he did not preserve his objection by raising it at 
trial when the evidence was offered and admitted (R. 281). A 
defendant is required to object to admission of evidence at trial 
even though a pretrial motion to suppress was made and denied. 
State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983). Even if defendant had 
objected at trial, the evidence was properly admitted. 
First, this Court must "payN great deterrence to a 
judicial determination of probable cause," Hansenf 50 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 3, as does the Utah Supreme Court. See also State v. 
Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280, 1286 (Utah 1983); State v. Romero, 660 
P.2d 715 (Utah 1983). "Search warrant affidavits are to be 
construed in a common-sense, reasonable manner." Hansen, 50 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 3; United States v. Lueth, 807 F.2d 719, 724-25 (8th 
Cir. 1986) . Courts should not undertake a de novo review of an 
affidavit's sufficiency or interpret them in a hypertechnical 
manner. United States v. Pelham, 801 F.2d 875, 877 (6th Cir. 
1986). 
The affidavit in this case, viewed in the totality of 
the circumstances established a fair probability that the cocaine 
existed and could be found where the informant stated. See State 
v. Bailev, 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984). While the affidavit 
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did not outline every instance in which the informant provided 
reliable information it implied that he had given reliable 
information over the past four months in paragraph 2. A fair 
reading of the paragraph indicates that the officer had worked 
with the informant and received other reliable information in the 
recent past which furthered police investigations. This Court 
should recognize that the affidavit was drafted by a nonlawyer in 
the "midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical 
requirements of elaborate specificity once enacted under common 
law pleading have no proper place in this area." United States 
v. Pelham, 801 F.2d at 877, quoting United States v. Ventresca, 
380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965). The Utah Courts have required a lesser 
standard of reliability and veracity where the circumstances as a 
whole indicated that the report was truthful. Bailey, 675 P.2d 
at 1206. The further information that a second confidential 
informant identified defendant as a drug dealer and that 
defendant was previously arrested on cocaine charges corroborates 
the first informant's information. C.f. Bailey, 675 P.2d at 
1206; and see Hansen, 50 Utah Adv. Rep. at 4. 
Defendant complains that the police officer made a 
fatal misstatement when he noted that defendant had been 
previously convicted of dealing cocaine. While it is undisputed 
that this statement was erroneous, it was not fatal to the 
determination of probable cause. Material misstatements are only 
fatal where, when they are excised, the affidavit lacks 
sufficient other facts upon which to base the probable cause 
determination. State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986). 
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Courts avoid suppressing evidence when the actual facts, if known 
to the magistrate would have resulted in a finding of probable 
cause, id. at 191. Here, there was sufficient other truthful 
information upon which probable cause was based. 
Defendant also contends that the officer lied about the 
existence of a second informant. This is an erroneous assertion. 
Leatham testified that the informant's statement was received 
through a fellow police officer. The affidavit does not indicate 
that this was first-hand knowledge. Since police officers often 
rely on hearsay information from other officers, and rightfully 
so, it was not error for the magistrate to rely on this 
information. See Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 192. 
Defendant finally argues that the affidavit was not 
truthful because the police did not find a large quantity of 
cocaine or even at least an ounce of cocaine. This information 
was not available at the time the afidavit was sworn and should 
not be used after the fact to second-guess the magistrate's 
finding of probable cause. The issue is whether the affidavit, 
as presented to the magistrate, presented a fair probability that 
at least an ounce of cocaine would be found in defendant's home. 
Because the affidavit establishes that the informant saw what 
looked like at least an ounce of cocaine within 24 hours of 
issuance of the warrant, the fact that a portion of the white 
powder tested out as something else at a later time is not 
controlling. The magistrate had before him sufficient facts to 
indicate a fair probability that cocaine was in defendant's home 
and the trial court properly refused to suppress the evidence. 
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Even if this Court were to find that there was not 
probable cause to issue the search warrant in this case, the 
cocaine was still admissible under Utah R. Crim. P. 12(g). Rule 
12(g) requires that a violation of constitutional rights be 
substantial and in bad faith before evidence can be suppressed. 
The trial court specifically found, in light of the evidence 
presented at the suppression hearing, that there was no 
violation; but if there was, it was insubstantial and made in 
good faith. Given the sometimes irreconcilable differences in 
court decisions in this area, the officer's actions in this case 
would not constitute a substantial violation of defendant's 
rights. Also given that the magistrate issued the search warrant 
based upon the affidavit as it was written, the officer acted in 
good faith in relying on its authority. Sgt. Leatham's actions 
reflected reasonable law enforcement activity that should not 
result in the exclusion of substantial, reliable evidence. See 
United States v. Leon, U.S. , 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984). 
Leatham could not be expected to know that the magistrate erred, 
if he did, in issuing the search warrant based upon the affidvait 
which alleged that the C.I. had proved his reliability in the 
last four months. See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
818 (1982) (holding that, in civil rights actions, government 
officials "are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar 
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory 




THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GRANT 
DISCLOSURE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT'S 
IDENTITY. 
Defendant asserts that the trial court should have 
granted his motion for disclosure of the C.I.'s identity. He 
insists that disclosure was necessary to establish the existence 
of the C.I. and to determine whether he had an opportunity to 
"plant" the cocaine which defendant denied belonged to him. 
Under the standard for disclosure of a C.I.'s identity outlined 
below, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion. 
The State possesses a limited privilege against 
disclosure of an informant's identity in order to protect the 
safety of informants and to preserve the continued free flow of 
information from such persons, Rovario v. United States, 353 
U.S. 53 (1957); c.f. State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986). 
The decision whether to provide a defendant with this information 
is within the discretion of the trial court and requires 
balancing of the defendant's need for the information against the 
government's interest in preserving its confidentiality. Id. 
Unless the C.I.'s identity is "essential to a fair determination 
of the issues," Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 193, due process does not 
require disclosure. Usually, the State need not disclose where 
the C.I.'s involvement was limited to the issue of probable 
cause, McCrav v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967), nor where he is 
not a witness United States v. Dvba, 554 F.2d 417 (10th Cir. 
1977) . 
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A defendant roust do more than speculate on the 
materiality of the C.I.'s identity and the usefulness of his 
testimony at trial. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 193; United States v. 
Burrell, 720 F.2d 1488, 1494 n. 8 (10th Cir. 1983); United States 
v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102r 1108 (4th Cir. 1985). Disclosure is not 
necessarily required even though defendant may have no other 
means of determining what relevant information the C.I. 
possesses. Smith, 780 F.2d at 1108. The most important factor 
to be considered is the materiality of the C.I.'s evidence to 
defendant's particular defense. Ld.; and see United States v. 
Grisham, 748 F.2d 460, 463-64 (8th Cir. 1984). And, this 
determination, again, is usually within the trial court's 
discretion. Smith, 780 F.2d at 1108. 
In this case, defendant insists that the C.I. was the 
only person who could adroit or deny his own existence and whether 
he was guilty of planting drugs in defendant's home. It is 
obvious that any defendant in circumstances similar to these 
could claim that someone planted the drugs and thereby frustrate 
the government's strong interest in protecting its C.I. In a 
similar case, however, at least one court has denied disclosure 
of an informant's identity. See United States v. Jefferson, 593 
F. Supp. 85, 89-90 (D.D.C. 1984). There, Jefferson claimed that 
someone set him up because he did not know about the existence of 
drugs found in the trunk of his car. The court observed that the 
C.I. would not be used as a witness to tie Jefferson to the drugs 
and that hundreds of other defendant's were in similar 
circumstances. Because only the officers' testimony was 
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necessary to tie Jefferson to the drugs and the C.I. took no part 
in any drug transaction but merely observed the drugs in the 
car's trunk at some point in time, the C.I.'s testimony was not 
material to the issues at trial. 
As the court noted in Miller v. United States, 273 F.2d 
279, 281 (5th Cir. 1959): 
If the informer's relation to the acts 
leading directly to or constituting the crime 
may be assumed from a fertile imagination of 
counsel, the Government in practically every 
case would have to prove affirmatively that 
the informant had not done any such likely 
acts. Having done that, all would be 
revealed and the informer privilege, deemed 
essential for the public interest, for all 
practical purposes would be no more. 
In this case, the trial court was satisfied from Sgt. 
Leatham's testimony that the C.I. did exist and so ruled (R. 53). 
The court was in a position to weigh the credibility of the 
testimony given by both Leatham and defendant about the C.I.'s 
existence. The court clearly resolved the issue in favor of the 
State. Moreover, defendant was not prevented from presenting his 
theory that there either was no informant and the officer planted 
the drugs or that the informant could have planted them. He and 
his roommate testified that no one was inside their home within 
24 hours of the search with their knowledge and consent. Their 
testimony would presumably have been the same had the C.I. been 
at trial claiming he was there and would have carried even less 
weight in the face of a warm body claiming otherwise, it is 
doubtful the C.I. would have appeared and testified that he 
planted drugs as defendant theorizes. 
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Admittedly, defendant goes further than challenging the 
mere existence of a C.I. to claim that he did not possess any 
cocaine and that the baggie of cocaine must have been planted in 
his home. On the other hand, defendant's attempt to identify the 
white powdery substance at the time it was discovered as vitamin 
B powder contradicts his claim that he did not know the baggie of 
powder was in his home. Given this contradiction, the trial 
court properly concluded that the identity of the C.I. was not 
material to defendant's defense. 
Defendant also urges this Court to adopt a rule 
requiring i_n camera hearings on the issue of disclosure of a 
C.I.'s identity. While there is some support in federal and 
other states' case law for such a hearing, this is a question of 
first impression in Utah. This Court should not lightly adopt 
such a requirement. Such hearings are one remedy for the dilemma 
presented when a court is faced with the difficult task of 
balancing the defendant's due process rights against the State's 
interest in nondisclosure, but they are certainly not required in 
all cases where a defendant raises the issue. United States v. 
Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793, 809 (9th Cir. 1984). See also Alderman v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). If the trial court is 
satisfied with the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the 
State and the defendant on the question of materiality without 
questioning of the C.I., as the court was here, then in camera 
proceedings would seem unnecessary. 
If this Court chooses to require an jj\ camera hearing 
in cases such as this one, then the State requests that this case 
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be remanded to the trial court for an in camera determination of 
the C.I.'s materiality to the defense rather than ordering 
dismissal as defendant suggests. Federal courts have remanded 
cases for similar proceedings, see e.g. Gaines v. Hess, 662 F.2d 
1364, 1367-68 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v. Freund, 525 F.2d 
873, 878 (5th Cir, 1976). Although Sgt. Leatham said he would 
not disclose the name of the C.I. to defendant or at trial under 
any circumstances, disclosure would not be necessary unless the 
trial court determined after the In camera hearing that 
disclosure was material to defendant's defense. Thus, an in 
camera hearing is not precluded as defendant suggests and would 
be a more reasonable result than outright reversal of defendant's 
conviction. 
The Court may wish to lay guidelines for the lower 
court's use should a remand be necessary. For this purpose, the 
discussion contained in Ordonez, 737 F.2d at 809-810, may provide 
assistance in fashioning a proceeding that is fair to defendant 
while maintaining the highest degree of protection for the C.I. 
until disclosure is ordered. 
CONCLUSION 
The State requests this Court to affirm the trial 
court's decisions on the motion to suppress evidence and upon the 
motion to disclose the C.I.'s identity. In the event this court 
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determines that an in camera hearing was necessary on the issue 
of disclosure, the State requests a remand for such a hearing. 
DATED this 3Qf& day of March, 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
/SANDRA L.^JOGR-EN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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APPENDIX A 
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PROVO CITY, UTAH COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
: OF ISSUANCE OF 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) SEARCH WARRANT 
I, Bradley S. Leatham, being first duly sworn on oath on this 
14th day of January, 1986, deposes and says: 
1. That your affiant is a police officer for the City of Provo 
and is currently assigned to the Detective Division, Special Operations 
Section. I am currently assigned as Sergeant of that unit. I have 
been employed as a police officer by Provo City for an excess of ten 
years. 
2. On the 14th day of January, 1986, I received information from 
a confidential informant that Robert P. Holyoak is in possession of a 
large amount of cocaine at the address of 414 East 200 South, Provo, Utah. 
3. That said informant has proven his reliability in the past four 
months. 
4. That within the last 24 hours said informant did observe what 
appeared to be at least one ounce of cocaine in the residence at 414 East 
200 South. 
5. The above mentioned residence at 414 East 200 South is described 
as a yellow stucco home located on the southeast corner of 4th East 2nd 
South. The entrance of the home is facing north and has double doors 
going into the residence from a porch. The residence has a driveway 
and carport on the east side of the home and has a large pine tree on 
the northwest corner of the lot. The home also has a seperate residence 
on the southern portion of the home with the entrance to that residence 
being on the west side. The numbers 414 are displayed on the front portion 
of the house facing north. 
6. The material being sought by application of this Search Warrant 
1s held in violation of the Utah Controlled Substance Act and is a felony 
of a third degree by simple possession. 
7. That said Robert Holyoak has in the past been convicted of 
sales of cocaine and has also been charged with possession of cocaine 
with intent to distribute. top 
2 
8. Information from a second confidential Informant states that 
Robert Holyoak distributes a large amount of cocaine, that cocaine is 
often transported 1n whatever vehicle he is driving and 1n a attache case. 
Also contained 1n the attache case would be a hand gun. Both the 
narcotics and the weapon have been observed in the attache case on numerous 
occasions. 
9. During the service of a Search Warrant in September, 1985, a 
large number of firearms were located consisting of handguns, shotguns, 
and long rifles, some semi-automatic. 
10. Hy experience as a police officer inthe detection of controlled 
substances is to the effect that this material is easily and quickly 
disposed of, either by intentional destruction or consumption and can be 
easily and quickly moved from its present location. 
11. Wherefore, I respectfully request that this Court issue its 
Warrant for the Search at any time of the day or night of the residence 
identified above and anyone inside for the presence of any controlled 
substance. 
12. By reason of the fact that the material is easily and quickly 
disposed of, I request that any Warrant for the Search of the said 
residence authorize entry into the residence without first advising the 
occupants thereof of authority or intent. 
13. Your affiant also requests that the Warrant be issued to 
search any vehicles in his possession or registered to him, due to 
the information outlined in paragraph 8 above. 
Unmy ^ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 14th day of January, 1986. 
TIME: 4"-f^~ 
/ 
